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Abstract 
We designed and fielded an experimental module in the 2014 HRS which seeks to measure older 
persons’ willingness to voluntarily defer claiming of Social Security benefits. In addition we 
evaluate the stated willingness of older individuals to work longer, depending on the Social 
Security incentives offered to delay claiming their benefits. Our project extends previous work 
by analyzing the results from our HRS module and comparing findings from other data sources, 
which included very much smaller samples of older persons. We show that half of the 
respondents would delay claiming if no work requirement were in place under the status quo, and 
only slightly fewer, 46 percent, with a work requirement. We also asked respondents how large a 
lump sum they would need with or without a work requirement. In the former case, the average 
amount needed to induce delayed claiming was about $60,400, while when part-time work was 
required, the average was $66,700. This implies a low utility value of leisure foregone of only 
$6,300, or about 10 percent of older households’ income. 
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When to claim Social Security benefits is a momentous financial decision confronting 
10,000 Baby Boomers retiring per day until the year 2029 (Pew, 2010). At present, these benefits 
are provided as a lifelong benefit stream beginning as early as age 62, or they can be delayed to 
later ages up to age 70. That is, claiming early reduces one’s benefit amounts, whereas deferring 
claiming entitles the individual to a lifetime benefit 8 percent higher per year that claiming is 
delayed (Maurer et al., 2016; Shoven and Slavov, 2012, 2014). Under current rules, on average 
the system neither makes nor loses money for those who delay, as the benefit increment earned 
by waiting is more or less actuarially fair.  
Yet contrary to basic insurance principles, most Americans claim benefits and stop working 
around age 62. One explanation for this behavior is that their advisers focus on the so-called 
“breakeven” approach to claiming: that is, they encourage workers to claim early to avoid 
potentially “forfeiting” their deferred benefits should they die too soon (Brown et al., 2016a). A 
second explanation for early claiming is that many people underweight the economic value of 
lifetime benefit streams (Brown et al., 2016b). This latter rationale motivates the current study, 
which explores whether making the benefit increment due to delayed claiming payable as a lump 
sum instead of a benefit stream, could serve as an incentive to drive later claiming and longer 
worklives.1  
In what follows, we describe an experimental module we designed and fielded in the 2014 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to measure older persons’ willingness to voluntarily defer 
claiming of Social Security benefits and potentially to work longer as a function of incentives to 
delay claiming their benefits. We focus on a nationally representative sample of people age 50-
70, for whom claiming decisions are of the utmost financial importance, and we investigate 
                                                          
1 Other incentives to encourage delayed claiming in the US context have been analyzed by Laitner and Silverman 
(2012); a recent analysis of delayed claiming in Norway is provided by Hernæs (2016). 
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whether and which individuals might be willing to delay claiming Social Security benefits in 
exchange for different compensation options.  
We find that many older Americans would be willing to delay claiming their Social 
Security benefits if they were offered an actuarially fair lump sum to do so. Overall, half (49.9 
percent) of the respondents say they would delay claiming if no work requirement were in place 
under the status quo, and only slightly fewer (46 percent) with a work requirement. When 
offered a lump sum of $60,000 to delay claiming, an amount that is approximately actuarially 
fair, willingness to delay rises to 70.3 percent without a work requirement, and 55.5 percent with 
a work condition. We also asked respondents to tell us how large a lump sum they would need 
with and without a work requirement. When no work is required, the average amount needed to 
induce delayed claiming is about $60,400, while when part-time work is required, the average 
was $66,700. This implies a low utility value of leisure foregone of only $6,300, or under 20 
percent of average household income. Our findings will interest policymakers seeking to 
encourage longer work lives by enhancing delayed claiming incentives.     
Prior Literature 
There are several good economic reasons that people might delay claiming their Social 
Security benefits rather than taking them as early as possible at age 62. One reason to defer 
claiming is that an 8 percent increase in benefits per year of delay is likely to be far more than 
most people can earn on their own (Coile et al., 2002). A second reason to delay claiming is that, 
even though the benefit increase is roughly actuarially fair, risk-averse individuals will value the 
higher deferred benefit as it provides insurance protection against outliving their retirement 
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savings.2 Yet another reason — particularly relevant to those in better-than-average health – is 
that this gives them access to higher payments for their anticipated, longer-than-average 
lifetimes.3  
In our prior theoretical work, we explored whether a reform that gave people an actuarially 
fair lump sum as a payment for delayed retirement rather than as an addition to their lifetime 
Social Security benefits might induce them to work longer on a voluntary basis (Chai et al., 
2013). We modeled the factors influencing how economic actors would trade off a benefit stream 
for a lump sum, and we examined the consequences of such tradeoffs for work, retirement, and 
life-cycle well-being. Our findings suggested that, given the chance to receive a delayed 
retirement credit as a lump sum payment, workers would delay retirement ages by one to two 
years, with little or no decline in welfare. Results were robust to the inclusion of bequest 
motives. Thus, from a theoretical vantage point, providing a lump sum does not simply result in 
wealth transfers to the next generation, consistent with the rationale for Social Security as a 
national social insurance scheme intended to support consumption for the elderly.  
In a previous empirical test of this idea, we used the American Life Panel to investigate 
related questions in a survey setting (Maurer et al., 2016). There we showed that people would 
voluntarily claim about six months later when a lump sum was paid for claiming beyond the 
Early Retirement Age. Overall, individuals stated that they would work about one-third to one-
half of the additional months, and those who said they preferred to claim young under the status 
quo were also most responsive to the lump sum offer. A drawback of that study is that it included 
respondents of all ages (18-70) to generate sufficient sample sizes for analysis, even though 
                                                          
2 Gustman and Steinmeir (2016) show that those who are more confident about the future of Social Security will 
delay claiming. 
3 Deferring claiming can also boost both spouse and spousal survivor benefits; see Gustman and Steinmeier (2015) 
and Huebner et al. (2015).  
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people 50 and older would be more likely to take the question seriously and evaluate its 
importance to their own lives. Accordingly, in what follows, we use a specially-designed module 
we developed for the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to concentrate on older individuals age 
51-70, the group for whom benefit claiming decisions are most relevant. 
Methods 
Our approach examines empirically whether people might be willing to delay claiming 
Social Security benefits in exchange for alternative compensation options. To this end, we 
devised and implemented a module on a subset of respondents age 70 or under in the 2014 HRS 
containing two sets of questions.4 The first set examined whether HRS respondents would be 
willing to receive their delayed retirement benefit from Social Security as a lump sum instead of 
a lifetime benefit stream, without their needing to work longer. In a second setting, we also 
explored leisure preferences by asking whether respondents who had to work longer would 
exchange delayed benefits for a lump sum. In both settings, the compensation for delay (and 
work, in the second case) was framed either as a lump sum or a lifelong payment stream.  
The No Work Condition:  
To introduce the concepts we sought to measure, we first showed each respondent a 
scenario as to whether he would prefer to claim $1,000 per month in monthly benefits at age 62, 
or wait to age 66 when he could claim $1,330 in monthly payments for life. This presentation 
stipulated that the individual had sufficient private saving so he would not need to work for any 
additional years: 
For the sake of these questions, assume that you are currently age 62, and you are 
single. You are thinking about when to claim your Social Security benefit. If you 
claim it at age 62, you will receive $1,000 per month for life. 
                                                          
4 The complete questionnaire appears in the Online Appendix.  
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Now imagine you have a choice: either you can receive that $1,000 monthly 
benefit from age 62 for life, or you can delay receiving the benefit until age 66. If 
you delay, assume that you have enough savings to live on without working 
from age 62 to age 66. Assume that, on average, the government will neither lose 
nor make money as a result. 
 
In exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit until age 66, you will 
receive a monthly benefit of $1,330 dollars per month from age 66 for life. Would 
you be willing to delay receiving your benefit until age 66? {Yes/No/DK/ RF} 
 
Since the size of the larger benefit payable for delay is consistent with the status quo Social 
Security rules, we classified a respondent as “willing to delay claiming under the Status Quo” if 
he responded “Yes” (WillingtoWaitSQ). Otherwise, his response was coded as “No, Don’t 
Know,” or “Refuse.”  
Next, we asked the respondent to indicate whether he would be willing to delay claiming 
for the actuarially equivalent value of $1,000 taken at age 62, or $1,000 plus a lump sum of 
$60,000 if claimed at age 665: 
Now suppose that in exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit until age 
66, you will then receive a monthly benefit of $1,000 per month from age 66 for 
life, plus a lump sum of $60,000 paid at age 66. Would you be willing to delay 
receiving your benefit to age 66? {Yes/No/DK/ RF} 
 
Someone saying “Yes” was routed to a subsequent question where he was asked to specify the 
smallest lump sum he would take, payable at age 66, paired with the same $1,000 monthly 
benefit.6 Someone saying “No” was routed to a question asking what he would need as a larger 
lump sum to delay benefits to age 66, again paired with the $1,000 monthly amount.  
  
                                                          
5 Assuming a 2.9 percent interest rate (used by the Social Security Trust Fund in its intermediate cost scenario), a 
unisex table based on mortality probabilities used in the Social Security’s Trustees Report (SSA, 2013), and a full 
retirement age of 66, the value of $60,000 is basically actuarially fair. See Maurer et al. (2016). 
6 Unfolding brackets in this and the next question were offered to people who did not give an amount; see the Online 
Appendix.  
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The Work Condition:  
The second presentation we showed respondents stipulated that the individual had to work at 
least half time to receive the higher deferred benefit:  
Again, assume you are currently age 62, and you are single. And again you have a 
similar choice: either you can receive that $1,000 monthly benefit for life from 
Social Security from age 62, or you can delay receiving the benefit until age 66. If 
you delay, again assume that you have enough savings to live on without working 
from age 62 to age 66, but you must work at least half time in all four years to 
get the increased benefit. Like before, assume that, on average, the government 
will neither lose nor make money as a result. 
 
In exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit and working four additional 
years until age 66, you will receive a monthly benefit of $1,330 per month from 
age 66 for life. Would you be willing to work longer and delay receiving the 
benefits to age 66? {Yes/No/DK/ RF} 
 
Instead, in exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit and working four 
additional years until age 66, you will receive a monthly benefit of $1,000 per 
month from age 66 for life, plus a lump sum of $60,000 paid at age 66. Would 
you be willing to work longer and delay receiving the benefits to age 66? 
{Yes/No/DK/ RF} 
 
Someone responding “Yes” to the last question with the work requirement was again routed to a 
subsequent question where he was asked to specify the smallest lump sum he would take, 
payable at age 66, paired with the same $1,000 monthly benefit.7 Someone saying “No” was 
routed to a question asking what he would need to get as a larger lump sum to delay benefits to 
age 66, again paired with the work requirement and the $1,000 monthly amount.  
Accordingly, the goals of this experiment were to measure the respondent’s willingness to 
trade a decrease in his annuity benefit stream for a delayed lump sum (i) if no extra work were 
required in the interim; and (ii) if at least half-time work were required. In what follows, we 
describe our results and examine how respondents answered these questions, controlling on 
                                                          
7 Unfolding brackets in this and the next question were offered to people who did not give an amount; see the Online 
Appendix.  
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important social and demographic factors including age, education, marital status, work history, 
risk aversion, and anticipated longevity, with the latter variables taken from the Core HRS.  
Results: Descriptive Statistics 
In Figure 1 we report the frequencies of dollar amounts respondents indicate they would 
demand in order to delay claiming benefits. The two lighter bars in each category indicate how 
much respondents would need to delay in the no work condition, while the two darker bars 
indicate the response when half-time work is required. The modal respondent indicated that his 
“price to delay” claiming from age 62 to age 66 was $60,000-$80,000, whether or not work was 
required. Nevertheless, a large share of those surveyed indicated that they would accept smaller 
amounts as lump sums. For instance, 34 percent would take less than $60,000 in the no work 
condition, and 30 percent would do so in the work condition. This is, as noted above, less than 
the actuarially fair amount. Very few respondents would demand more than $100,000 to delay 
claiming: only 3 percent in the no work condition, and 5 percent in the work condition.   The 
dollar value of the lump sum required to incentivize people to delay claiming in the no-work 
condition averaged $53,711 (with a standard deviation of $29,000), while the amount was 
$61,406 (with a larger standard deviation of $53,417) when part-time work was required.  
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Figure 1: Frequencies of Dollar Amounts Needed to Delay Claiming under the Status Quo 
versus Lump Sum for Delayed Claiming 
 
Panel A 
 
 
Panel B: 
 
 
Notes: Panel A reports frequencies of dollar amounts for six categories respondents of a HRS 
2014 subset indicate they would demand to delay claiming benefits from age 62 to 66. The two 
lighter bars in each category indicate the no work condition, while the two darker bars indicate 
the response when half-time work is required. Panel B reports summary statistics. Source: 
Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 1 reports the frequency of respondents indicating they would delay claiming under 
the Lump Sum versus the Status Quo. The statistics report respondents’ willingness to delay 
overall, as well as by sex, age bracket, educational category, race/ethnicity, and self-reported 
health (“excellent/very good/good” versus “fair/poor”). Our findings show that, overall, close to 
half — 49.9 percent — of the respondents agreed that they would delay claiming if no work 
No Work With Work
Will delay Will delay
Mean $ 53,711 61,406
Std. Dev. $ 29,213 53,417
N 430 412
Overall N
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requirement were in place under the status quo, and only slightly fewer, 46 percent, with a work 
requirement. Many people indicated they would delay claiming if they could access a lump sum 
of $60,000 at the later age. For instance, in the no work condition, 20 percentage points more 
respondents would delay claiming, for an increase of 41 percent on a base of 49.9 percentage 
points. In the case where delayed claiming meant more work, 9.4 percentage points more 
respondents would delay claiming, for an increase of 22 percent on a base of 45.6 percentage 
points.  
Table 1.  Frequency ( percent) Saying They Would Delay Claiming under the Status Quo 
versus a Lump Sum of $60,000, and Differences by Work versus No Work Condition 
 No work With Work 
 Status 
Quo 
Lump 
Sum 
LS-SQ 
Diff 
% change Status 
Quo 
Lump 
Sum 
LS-SQ 
Diff 
% change 
Total 49.9 70.3 20.4 40.9% 45.6 55.5 9.9 21.7% 
Men 46.3 69 22.7 49.0% 46 55.9 9.9 21.5% 
Women 52.5 71.3 18.8 35.8% 45.3 55.2 9.9 21.9% 
50-59 51.5 73 21.5 41.7% 46.2 59.1 12.9 27.9% 
60-70 48.6 67.6 19 39.1%` 44.5 51.9 7.4 16.6% 
HS or less 44.5 66.9 22.4 50.3% 45 44.1 -0.9 -2.0% 
Some 
College+ 
54.6 73.3 18.7 34.2% 46 56 10 21.7% 
White 51.3 72.8 21.5 41.9% 46.4 55.5 9.1 19.6% 
Black 45.6 67.4 21.8 47.8% 39.8 56.2 16.4 41.2% 
Other 51.5 63.1 11.6 22.5% 53.5 53.1 -0.4 -0.7% 
Health 
E/VG/G 
51.6 72.8 21.2 41.1% 47.1 56.5 9.4 20.0% 
Health F/P 45.5 63.9 18.4 40.4% 41.8 32.6 -9.2 -22.0% 
Notes: The table reports relative frequencies (in percent of the overall sample) of respondents 
indicate they would delay claiming of benefits from age 62 to 66. Left panel represents the no 
work condition, while the right panel reports when half-time work is required. Source: Authors’ 
calculations. 
It is interesting that the percent of men willing to delay claiming under the status quo was 
slightly lower than women, though in the no work condition, more men were willing to delay (49 
percent) than women (36 percent). About the same fraction, 10 percent, indicated they would 
delay if they had to work part time. For those ages 50-70 when surveyed, more than 39-40 
10 
 
percent agreed to delay for a lump sum in the no work condition, and 17-29 percent would delay 
if they had to work part time. Interestingly, both the less-educated and those with some college 
or more would both delay claiming for the Lump Sum without the work requirement, by 34-50 
percent. But while the better-educated group would still delay with the work requirement, the 
less educated did not find this appealing. Similar percentage increases — 42-48 percent — are 
observed for Whites and Blacks without the work requirement, while with a work condition, 
relatively fewer Whites would delay. Nonetheless with a work requirement, for all but the 
“Other” group, people express substantial willingness to delay claiming for the actuarially fair 
lump sum. And finally, Table 1 shows that people self-reporting themselves to be in “excellent,” 
“very good,” or “good” health, are much more likely — 41 percent more so - to delay claiming 
with a lump sum and no work requirement, and 20 percent more with the work condition. 
Interestingly, delayed claiming for people in fair or poor health rises 40 percent without the work 
requirement, but falls by 22 percent with the work condition. In other words, the additional work 
requirement was particularly disliked by those in poor health. 
Results: Multivariate Analysis  
Next we turn to a multivariate linear probability analysis to investigate which sorts of 
people would delay claiming under the Lump Sum offer versus the Status Quo. Table 2 provides 
regression results, first for a stripped-down model that controls for whether the person was 
willing to delay under the status quo, as well as key socio-demographic controls: male, age, 
education, White, self-reported health, and the natural log of household income. Second, we 
extend the set of controls to include indicators for the respondent being married, having an 
optimistic expectation of own survival probability (compared to an age/sex-specific cohort life 
table), household wealth, a financial literacy score, a cognition score, the number of living 
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children (as a proxy for a bequest motive), and the respondent’s estimated chance of leaving an 
inheritance.8 The sample size in Columns 1 and 2 includes our entire sample, since everyone 
received the question on willingness to delay for the initially-offered lump sum of $60,000. The 
next two columns focus on the subset of persons who indicated they would be willing to delay 
for less than this actuarially fair amount, and the final two columns include only those who 
stipulated they would be willing to delay for more. Panel A of Table 2 reports findings for the 
no-work condition, while Panel B summarizes outcomes when the part-time work condition is 
applied. 
  
                                                          
8 The cognition score is provided in the RAND 2012 version of the HRS survey, and the financial literacy score is 
taken from the 2014 HRS core; the latter is the sum of the number of correct answers to the financial literacy 
questions in the module. Means for all variables appear in the Appendix Table. 
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Table 2. Linear Probability Regressions on Probability of Delaying under the Lump Sum 
A.  No Work Condition 
$1k/mon + $60k $1k/mon + <$60k $1k/mon + >$60k
WillingtoWaitSQ (V652)
Male
Age less than 59
Some college +
White
Self-reported good health
Ln(HH income)
Married
Optimistic live
Wealth ($1,000)
Financial literacy index
Cognition score
# living children
Prob. leave inheritance 10k/+
0.387 ***
(0.028)
-0.003
(0.029)
0.056 **
(0.028)
-0.006
(0.029)
0.046
(0.030)
0.050
(0.032)
0.014 **
(0.007)
0.380 ***
(0.028)
-0.017
(0.030)
0.065 **
(0.028)
-0.023
(0.032)
0.041
(0.031)
0.027
(0.032)
0.010
(0.008)
-0.020
(0.030)
0.039
(0.031)
0.000
(0.000)
0.007
(0.020)
0.005
(0.004)
0.019 ***
(0.007)
0.001
(0.000)
0.233 ***
(0.036)
0.064 *
(0.037)
0.082 **
(0.037)
-0.020
(0.037)
0.026
(0.040)
-0.020
(0.043)
-0.031 ***
(0.010)
0.240 ***
(0.036)
0.061
(0.039)
0.090 **
(0.037)
-0.036
(0.041)
0.031
(0.043)
-0.027
(0.044)
-0.037 ***
(0.010)
0.013
(0.040)
0.037
(0.040)
0.000
(0.000)
0.025
(0.025)
-0.008 *
(0.005)
0.006
(0.009)
0.000
(0.001)
0.310 ***
(0.081)
0.048
(0.061)
0.106 *
(0.063)
0.061
(0.064)
0.053
(0.063)
0.058
(0.065)
0.001
(0.014)
0.344 ***
(0.076)
-0.003
(0.062)
0.097
(0.064)
-0.022
(0.071)
-0.030
(0.064)
-0.009
(0.068)
-0.011
(0.015)
0.102
(0.069)
-0.029
(0.072)
0.000
(0.000)
0.085 **
(0.042)
-0.004
(0.009)
-0.013
(0.020)
0.002 **
(0.001)
Intercept 0.275 ***
(0.072)
0.148
(0.102)
0.426 ***
(0.107)
0.600 ***
(0.139)
0.197
(0.139)
0.349 *
(0.205)
N 889 889 612 612 256 256
R-squared 0.203 0.222 0.085 0.102 0.090 0.181
Mean of dependent variable 0.703 0.703 0.306 0.306 0.414 0.414
Std.dev. of dependent variable 0.457 0.457 0.461 0.461 0.494 0.494  
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Table 2 cont.: B.  With Work Condition 
$1k/mon + $60k
WillingtoWaitSQ (V652) 0.302 ***
(0.032)
Male 0.025
(0.033)
Age less than 59 0.063 *
(0.033)
Some college + -0.026
(0.035)
White -0.003
(0.034)
Self-reported good health 0.028
(0.037)
Ln(HH income) -0.004
(0.008)
Married
Optimistic live
Wealth ($1,000)
Financial literacy index
Cognition score
# living children
Prob. leave inheritance 10k/+
Intercept 0.398 ***
(0.086)
N 860
0.300 ***
(0.033)
0.022
(0.034)
0.061 *
(0.033)
-0.023
(0.038)
-0.005
(0.036)
0.021
(0.038)
-0.007
(0.009)
0.053
(0.036)
0.062 *
(0.037)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.011
(0.023)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
0.355 ***
(0.123)
860
$1k/mon
0.226 ***
(0.039)
0.103 **
(0.042)
0.060
(0.042)
-0.048
(0.042)
0.035
(0.044)
-0.050
(0.049)
-0.022 **
(0.011)
0.357 ***
(0.116)
470
 + <$60k
0.228 ***
(0.039)
0.107 **
(0.044)
0.074 *
(0.043)
-0.063
(0.048)
0.042
(0.048)
-0.076
(0.051)
-0.027 **
(0.011)
-0.016
(0.045)
-0.004
(0.046)
0.000
(0.000)
0.005
(0.030)
0.002
(0.006)
0.017
(0.012)
0.000
(0.001)
0.312 *
(0.160)
470
$1k/mon
0.168 ***
(0.054)
0.131 ***
(0.049)
-0.021
(0.050)
-0.058
(0.052)
0.015
(0.056)
0.009
(0.054)
0.039 ***
(0.013)
-0.146
(0.132)
369
 + >$60k
0.162 ***
(0.054)
0.083
(0.052)
-0.021
(0.050)
-0.097 *
(0.057)
-0.037
(0.058)
-0.028
(0.057)
0.031 **
(0.014)
0.036
(0.053)
0.001
(0.055)
0.000
(0.000)
0.091 ***
(0.034)
-0.005
(0.007)
0.014
(0.013)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.077
(0.187)
369
R-squared 0.101 0.115 0.086 0.113 0.081 0.122
Mean of dependent variable 0.555 0.555 0.299 0.299 0.346 0.346
Std.dev. of dependent variable 0.497 0.497 0.458 0.458 0.476 0.476  
Notes: ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models also include missing 
value dummies with robust errors clustered on HH.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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One clear finding in Panel A is that those who were most likely to delay claiming under the 
status quo were also more willing to delay under the Lump Sum condition. The size of the 
association is substantial: Someone willing to delay under the current system would be 23-38 
percentage points more likely to delay given the lump sum, holding other things constant. This 
translates into an increase of 54 percent-74 percent given the lump sum and no work option.9 In 
Panel B with the work requirement, the changes are slightly smaller, 46-53 percent, but still 
substantial.10 
We also see in Table 2 that men and women do not differ in their willingness to delay 
without a work condition, while men were somewhat more willing to defer with the work 
condition. Those younger than 59 when surveyed were also slightly more responsive than their 
older counterparts. We found very few systematic differences by race, education, health, long-
life expectations, cognition, the number of living children, or by marital status and wealth. Only 
for the subset of those requiring a lump sum in excess of $60,000 was there a significant positive 
effect of the financial literacy score; this confirms with other research showing that more 
financially literate individuals are more likely to understand annuities (Brown et al., 2016a, b).  
Table 3 permits us to examine how much people required in terms of the lump sum that 
would be sufficient to get them to delay claiming. Panel A focuses on responses in the no work 
requirement condition, and Panel B on the work requirement condition. In each case, the first and 
second columns include the same set of controls as before. The dependent variable is measured 
in thousands of dollars, with mean values appearing at the base of the table.11   
  
                                                          
9 That is, 54 percent (=38/70) and 74 percent (=23/31). 
10 That is, 46% (=16/35) and 53% (=30/56). 
11 The sample for this table omits one respondent who indicated needing $10 million to delay, as well as anyone 
with missing values for the status quo question.  
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Table 3: Linear Multivariate Regressions on Dollar Amount ($000) Needed to Delay: Status 
Quo versus Lump Sum  
A.  No Work Condition 
 
(cont)  
  
$1k/mon + $60k $1k/mon + <$60k $1k/mon + >$60k
WillingtoWaitSQ (V652)
Male
Age less than 59
Some college +
White
Self-reported good health
Ln(HH income)
Married
Optimistic live
Wealth ($1,000)
Financial literacy index
Cognition score
# living children
Prob. leave inheritance 10k+
-14.519 ***
(2.632)
2.175
(2.482)
-1.810
(2.377)
7.859 ***
(2.277)
2.701
(2.193)
0.774
(1.996)
1.100 **
(0.471)
-14.289 ***
(2.516)
1.521
(2.838)
-1.310
(2.315)
4.721 **
(1.905)
-0.279
(2.104)
-0.292
(2.106)
0.726
(0.487)
-1.457
(2.469)
-2.442
(2.687)
0.004
-0.005
2.884
(2.557)
0.244
(0.350)
-0.076
(0.411)
0.019
(4.550)
-5.320 ***
(1.162)
-0.605
(1.193)
-0.808
(1.214)
2.487 **
(1.194)
-0.058
(1.366)
-0.053
(1.389)
1.595 ***
(0.491)
-5.440 ***
(1.147)
-0.355
(1.230)
-0.833
(1.229)
2.388 *
(1.280)
-1.054
(1.473)
-0.136
(1.397)
1.593 ***
(0.520)
-1.014
(1.357)
-2.703 *
(1.444)
0.000
(0.001)
-0.622
(0.758)
0.565 ***
(0.168)
0.143
(0.300)
-0.006
(7.019)
2.436
(14.473)
8.108
(8.559)
0.731
(7.936)
21.097 ***
(7.204)
9.495
(6.696)
3.374
(5.205)
0.856
(0.936)
1.265
(15.110)
0.762
(9.392)
4.858
(7.815)
11.203 *
(6.744)
3.140
(6.245)
-0.235
(6.901)
0.042
(0.824)
-1.594
(6.875)
3.489
(9.082)
0.016
(0.019)
12.140
(9.187)
-0.557
(1.220)
0.717
(1.965)
0.083
(9.607)
Intercept 49.564 ***
(4.922)
47.485 ***
(7.803)
38.560 ***
(5.139)
28.030 ***
(6.227)
48.563 ***
(10.855)
56.188 **
(23.121)
N 853 853 611 611 242 242
R-squared 0.058 0.075 0.09 0.126 0.061 0.129
Mean of dependent variable 60.396 60.396 52.591 52.591 80.103 80.103
Std.dev. of dependent variable 37.462 37.462 14.813 14.813 62.141 62.141
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Table 3 cont. B.  With Work Condition 
 
Notes: ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level. All models also include missing 
value dummies with robust errors clustered on HH. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
  
$1k/mon + $60k $1k/mon + <$60k $1k/mon + >$60k
WillingtoWaitSQ (V652)
Male
Age less than 59
Some college +
White
Self-reported good health
Ln(HH income)
Married
Optimistic live
Wealth ($1,000)
Financial literacy index
Cognition score
# living children
Prob. leave inheritance 10k+
-5.944 **
(2.696)
0.205
(2.854)
-0.647
(3.258)
5.664 **
(2.516)
5.101 *
(2.610)
2.765
(1.930)
1.492 ***
(0.521)
-5.471 **
(2.665)
-1.197
(3.202)
0.280
(3.111)
3.619
(2.295)
2.735
(2.375)
1.449
(1.938)
1.028 **
(0.500)
1.534
(2.194)
-2.120
(2.884)
0.007
(0.005)
3.937 **
(1.817)
-0.732 *
(0.384)
0.717
(0.459)
0.045
(2.668)
-5.589 ***
(1.181)
-3.137 **
(1.335)
-0.969
(1.305)
1.995
(1.294)
-0.704
(1.415)
1.046
(1.593)
1.101 **
(0.473)
-5.654 ***
(1.208)
-2.887 **
(1.418)
-1.313
(1.299)
2.592 *
(1.510)
-1.191
(1.521)
1.383
(1.625)
1.174 **
(0.506)
-0.344
(1.500)
-0.745
(1.472)
-0.001
(0.001)
-0.507
(0.886)
0.067
(0.223)
0.174
(0.373)
0.013
(2.627)
9.897
(7.372)
5.077
(5.761)
3.990
(7.606)
7.914
(4.928)
10.084 *
(5.153)
5.539
(3.866)
1.974 **
(0.993)
8.737
(7.225)
1.289
(6.614)
5.113
(6.925)
3.685
(4.255)
5.934
(4.755)
1.810
(3.947)
1.107
(0.800)
5.026
(3.828)
-0.540
(5.990)
0.009
(0.008)
5.859
(3.954)
-1.036 *
(0.597)
0.798
(0.862)
0.073
(6.053)
Intercept 42.956 ***
(7.249)
55.699 ***
(8.191)
45.729 ***
(4.827)
42.854 ***
(6.355)
34.648 **
(14.800)
56.288 ***
(14.604)
N 830 830 468 468 358 358
R-squared 0.023 0.051 0.083 0.134 0.045 0.082
Mean of dependent variable 63.665 63.665 53.216 53.216 77.365 77.365
Std.dev. of dependent variable 43.917 43.917 14.052 14.052 62.361 62.361
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Focusing first on Panel A, we note that the average amount needed to delay claiming was 
about $60,400 for the entire sample. Among those needing less than the initially-offered lump 
sum, the average was only $53,000, while it amounted to $80,100 among those needing more. 
By comparison, in Panel B we see that imposing the work condition raises the average amount 
required by way of a required lump sum. Here the overall average was $66,700 for the entire 
sample, with a mean of $53,200 among those willing to take a lump sum less than initially 
offered, and $77,400 among those requiring more. This implies that the utility value of the 
leisure foregone from part-time work until the delayed claiming age of 66 in the second 
condition is only about $6,300 on average,12 a relatively low amount compared to average 
household income of $67,000.  
Results in Panel A also indicate that those willing to delay under the status quo generally 
needed a smaller lump sum to delay under the no work condition. For instance, the first two 
columns show that respondents’ desired lump sums amounted to $14,000 (or 35 percent) less if 
they had earlier indicated willingness to delay claiming. People previously stating they were 
willing to delay for less than $60,000 if offered would need only about $5,300 to delay.  This is 
striking in that it is less than 10 percent of the actuarially fair lump sum value. Respondents 
indicating they would demand a lump sum over $60,000 to delay, in the final two columns, 
required a lump sum of $80,000 on average, and previous indications that they were willing to 
delay did not alter this requirement. Additionally, the amounts needed did not differ hugely 
across different types of respondents, by and large. Thus men, younger persons, whites, those in 
good health, those with more living children, and those planning on leaving an inheritance, were 
not statistically different from their counterparts. There is a suggestion that those with more 
                                                          
12 i.e., $60,400 versus $66,700 on average.  
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education tended to demand a higher lump sum, and those with higher income did as well. The 
effect of cognition scores is uneven across columns.  
Similar results obtain in Panel B of Table 3. Generally speaking, younger persons, whites, 
those in good health, those with more living children, and those planning on leaving an 
inheritance, were not statistically different from their counterparts. People with higher household 
income did require higher lump sums, and having a higher cognition score was again uneven 
across columns and only marginally statistically significant.  
Conclusions and Policy Significance 
Our survey using a nationally representative sample of older Americans ages 50-70 has 
demonstrated that many respondents would be willing to delay claiming their Social Security 
benefits if they were offered a lump sum to do so. This would have a positive effect on their 
retirement security, in that their Social Security income stream will rise each year of delay, and 
indeed benefits claimed at age 70 are more than 75 percent higher than at age 62. Our survey 
posed two scenarios to our respondents, one asked whether they would be willing to receive their 
delayed Social Security retirement benefit as a lump sum instead of a lifetime benefit stream, 
without their having to work longer, and the second asked whether respondents would take 
delayed benefits instead of a lump sum if they had to work longer.   
We show that many people would delay claiming if they could access a lifelong benefit 
plus an actuarially fair lump sum payment, instead of only the higher lifelong benefit as is the 
case in the current system. For instance, without the work condition, 20 percentage points 
additional respondents would delay claiming compared to the status quo, and when part-time 
work is required, 9.4 percentage points more respondents would do so. Moreover, many people 
would be willing to delay claiming for much less than an actuarially fair value. We emphasize 
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that people indicate that they would do so voluntarily and would be better off than under the 
current rules. Accordingly, in no sense would this make them worse off in retirement. 
This is important for a number of reasons. First, recent evidence indicates that working 
longer may well be associated with better mental and physical health (Rohwedder and Willis, 
2009). Second, if subsets of the population would be willing to delay and work longer for a less-
than actuarially fair lump sum, it suggests that the system could save money by providing these 
lump sums and people would be better off since they would have access to the delayed claiming 
lump sum incentive plus the base annuity. Third, from a macroeconomic perspective, longer 
work lives also offer additional economic resources to help cover the costs of population aging 
(NRC, 2013).  Accordingly, methods that would prompt people to voluntarily delay claiming 
Social Security benefits in exchange for lump sums — and possibly work longer — could benefit 
society and the older individuals as well.   
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Appendix: Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
No work condition With work condition
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
$ Amount of lumpsum ($1,000) 60.40 37.46 63.66 43.92
WillingtoWaitSQ (V652) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Male 0.43 0.49 0.43 0.50
Age less than 59 0.47 0.50 0.48 0.50
Some college + 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50
White 0.63 0.48 0.62 0.48
Self-reported good health 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45
Ln(HH income) 10.33 2.07 10.33 2.10
Married 0.59 0.49 0.59 0.49
Optimistic live 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46
Wealth ($1,000) 308 721 309 729
Financial literacy index 1.26 0.88 1.27 0.87
Cognition score 23.32 4.26 23.34 4.22
# living children 2.89 1.91 2.89 1.86
Prob. leave inheritance 10k+ 59.07 39.83 59.32 39.69
 N 853 830
Source: Authors’ calculations using the HRS (see text). 
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Online Appendix: HRS 2014 Module 2 
Administered to a random sample of respondents age 70 and younger 
 
V651_INTRO-NOWRK 
INTRODUCTION FOR NO WORK REQUIRED 
For the sake of these questions, assume that you are currently age 62, and you are single. You are thinking about 
when to claim your Social Security benefit. If you claim it at age 62, you will receive $1,000 per month for life. 
Now imagine you have a choice: either you can receive that $1,000 monthly benefit from age 62 for life, or you can 
delay receiving the benefit until age 66. If you delay, assume that you have enough savings to live on without 
working from age 62 to age 66. Assume that, on average, the government will neither lose nor make money as a 
result. 
 
V652_ NOWRKDEL-ANN 
NO WORK- IF DELAY TO 66 FOR LGR ANNUITY 
In exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit until age 66, you will receive a monthly benefit of $1,330 
dollars per month from age 66 for life. Would you be willing to delay receiving your benefit until age 66? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
8. DK 
9. RF 
 
V653_NOWRKDEL-LS 
NO WORK-IF DELAY TO 66 PLUS LUMP SUM 
Now suppose that in exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit until age 66, you will then receive a 
monthly benefit of $1,000 per month from age 66 for life, plus a lump sum of $60,000 paid at age 66. 
Would you be willing to delay receiving your benefit to age 66? 
1. Yes 
5. No  GO TO V659 
8. DK  GO TO V664 
9. RF  GO TO V664 
 
V654_NOWRK-IFLESSLS 
NO WORK- IF SMALLER LUMP SUM IF DELAY TO 66 
You indicated that you would be willing to delay your benefit until age 66 in exchange for a lump sum of $60,000 
paid at age 66 and a monthly benefit of $1,000 for life. Would you be willing to take a smaller lump sum with the 
same monthly benefit? 
1. Yes 
5. No  GO TO V664 
8. DK  GO TO V664 
9. RF  GO TO V664 
 
V655_NOWRK-LESSLSAMT 
NO WRK-SMALLEST LUMP SUM TO DELAY AMOUNT 
What is the smallest lump-sum that you would be willing to accept in exchange for delaying your benefit to age 66? 
[IWER: ENTER ‘-1’ IF R SAYS “would not accept any lump sum”] 
$ ______  GO TO V664 
Amount (Range -1 to $99,999,997) 
DK 99999998 
RF 99999999 
 
V656 – V658 Unfolding Sequence 
Would it be less than $, more than $, or what? 
PROCEDURE: 1UP1DOWN 
BREAKPOINTS: $30,000, $40,000, $50,000 
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-------- GO TO V664 -------- 11 
 
V659_NOWRK-IFLRGRLS 
NO WRK-IF MORE THAN 60K LUMP SUM TO DELAY 
You indicated that you would not be willing to delay your benefit until age 66 in exchange for a lump sum of 
$60,000 paid at age 66 and a monthly benefit of $1,000 for life. Would you be willing to delay in exchange for a 
larger lump sum with the same monthly benefit? 
1. Yes 
5. No  GO TO V664 
8. DK  GO TO V664 
9. RF  GO TO V664 
 
V660_NOWRK-LRGRLSAMT 
NO WRK-LRGR THAN 60K LUMP SUM MIN AMOUNT 
What is the smallest lump-sum that you would be willing to accept in exchange for delaying your benefit to age 66? 
[IWER: ENTER ‘-1’ IF R SAYS “would not accept any lump sum”] 
$ ______  GO TO V664 
Amount (Range -1 to $99,999,997) 
DK 99999998 
RF 99999999 
 
V661 – V663 Unfolding Sequence 
Would it be less than $, more than $, or what? 
PROCEDURE: 1UP1DOWN 
BREAKPOINTS: $70,000, $80,000, $90,000 
DK 99999998 
RF 99999999 
 
ASK EVERYONE 
V664_INTRO-WORK 
Again, assume you are currently age 62, and you are single. And again you have a similar choice: either you can 
receive that $1,000 monthly benefit for life from Social Security from age 62, or you can delay receiving the benefit 
until age 66. If you delay, again assume that you have enough savings to live on without working from age 62 to age 
66, but you must work at least half time in all four years to get the increased benefit. Like before, assume that, on 
average, the government will neither lose nor make money as a result. 
 
V665_WRK-DEL66ANN 
WORK_DELAY TO 66_ANNUITY 
In exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit and working four additional years until age 66, you will 
receive a monthly benefit of $1,330 per month from age 66 for life. 
Would you be willing to work longer and delay receiving the benefits to age 66? 
1. Yes 
5. No 
8. DK 
9. RF 
 
V666_WORK-DELLS 
WORK-IF DELAY TO 66 PLUS LUMP SUM 
Instead, in exchange for delaying your Social Security benefit and working four additional years until age 66, you 
will receive a monthly benefit of $1,000 per month from age 66 for life, plus a lump sum of $60,000 paid at age 66. 
Would you be willing to work longer and delay receiving the benefits to age 66? 
1. Yes 
5. No  GO TO V672 
8. DK  GO TO V677 
9. RF  GO TO V677 
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V667_WORK-IFLESSLS 
WORK- IF SMALLER LUMP SUM IF DELAY TO 66 
You indicated that you would be willing to delay your benefit and work four additional years until age 66 in 
exchange for a lump sum of $60,000 paid at age 66 and a monthly benefit of $1,000 for life. Would you be willing 
to take a smaller lump sum with the same monthly benefit? 
1. Yes 
5. No  GO TO V677 
8. DK  GO TO V677 
9. RF  GO TO V677 
 
V668_WRK-LESSLSAMT 
WORK-SMALLEST LUMP SUM TO DELAY AMOUNT 
What is the smallest lump-sum that you would be willing to accept in exchange for working and delaying your 
benefit to age 66? 
[IWER: ENTER ‘-1’ IF R SAYS “would not accept any lump sum”] 
$ ______  GO TO V677 
Amount (Range -1 to $99,999,997) 
DK 99999998 
RF 99999999 
 
V669-V671 Unfolding Sequence 
Would it be less than $, more than $, or what? 
PROCEDURE: 1UP1DOWN 
BREAKPOINTS: $30,000, $40,000, $50,000 
------------ GO TO V677 ---------- 
 
V672_WRK-IFLRGRLS 
WORK-IF MORE THAN 60K LUMP SUM TO DELAY 
You indicated that you would not be willing to work and delay your benefit until age 66 in exchange for a lump sum 
of $60,000 paid at age 66 and a monthly benefit of $1,000 for life. Would you be willing to work to age 66 and 
delay in exchange for a larger lump sum with the same monthly benefit? 
1. Yes 
5. No  GO TO V677 
8. DK  GO TO V677 
9. RF  GO TO V677 
 
V673_ WRKDEL-MORE 
WORK-LRGR THAN 60K LUMP SUM MIN AMOUNT 
What is the smallest lump-sum that you would be willing to accept in exchange for working and delaying your 
benefit to age 66? 
[IWER: ENTER ‘-1’ IF R SAYS “would not accept any lump sum”] 
$___________  GO TO V677 
Amount (Range -1 to $99,999,997) 
DK 99999998 
RF 99999999 
 
V674-V676 Unfolding Sequence 
Would it be less than $, more than $, or what? 
________ 
PROCEDURE: 1UP1DOWN 
BREAKPOINTS: $70,000, $80,000, $90,000 
 
ASK EVERYONE: 
V677_HOWCLEAR 
HOW CLEAR WERE QUESTIONS 
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How clear were the questions we asked -- were they unclear, somewhat clear, mostly clear, or very clear? 
1. Unclear 
2. Somewhat clear 
3. Mostly clear 
4. Very clear 
8. DK 
9. RF 
